Supplemental Materials for, "Bad Times Keep us Together: Policy Priorities and Economic Shocks"

January 17, 2024


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1 Operationalizing Partisanship: Unified Government


In this section, we test the robustness of our results to changing the operationalization of partisan government. In the main document we used a dichotomous variable equal to one if the governor in state i in year t belonged to the Democratic Party, and zero otherwise.¹ In this section we test the robustness our our main findings by substituting the governor partisan variable for a variable equal to one if all chambers (governor, House, and Senate) in a state are controlled by either the Democratic or Republican party The political data are from Klarner (2013). The six plots shown in the main paper are replicated below, using the recoded variable of partisanship, and labeled as "Unified, Any Party".

¹Note that this nearly always meant a Republican since Independent governors made up less than two percent of the sample.




Note: x's indicate sample means (starting composition)






Note: x's indicate sample means (starting composition)

Figure 1: Drop in Own Personal Income (Unified, Any Party)




Note: x's indicate sample means (starting composition)






Note: x's indicate sample means (starting composition)

Figure 2: Rise in Own Unemployment (Unified, Any Party)




Note: x's indicate sample means (starting composition)






Note: x's indicate sample means (starting composition)

Figure 3: Drop in Surrounding Income (Unified, Any Party)





Note: x's indicate sample means (starting composition)






Note: x's indicate sample means (starting composition)





Unified (All) to Non-Unified

Note: x's indicate sample means (starting composition)




Non-Unified to Unified (All)

Figure 5: Switching Control (Unified, Any Party)


2 Operationalizing Partisanship: Unified Government (Democratic)

In this section we replicate the same results as in the previous section, although now the dichotomous partisan control variable is equal to one *only* if the Democratic party is in control of the House, Senate, and the governorship in a state, and zero otherwise.




Note: x's indicate sample means (starting composition)






Note: x's indicate sample means (starting composition)

Figure 6: Drop in Own Personal Income (Unified, Democrat)




Note: x's indicate sample means (starting composition)






Note: x's indicate sample means (starting composition)

Figure 7: Rise in Own Unemployment (Unified, Democrat)




Note: x's indicate sample means (starting composition)






Note: x's indicate sample means (starting composition)

Figure 8: Drop in Surrounding Income (Unified, Democrat)




Note: x's indicate sample means (starting composition)






Note: x's indicate sample means (starting composition)





Unified (Dem) to Non-Unified

Note: x's indicate sample means (starting composition)




Non-Unified to Unified (Dem)

Figure 10: Switching Control (Unified, Democrat)


3 Operationalizing Partisanship: Unified Legislature

In this section we code partisan control as a dichotomous variable equal to one if a single party controls both the House and Senate.




Note: x's indicate sample means (starting composition)









Note: x's indicate sample means (starting composition)

Non-Unified







Figure 12: Rise in Own Unemployment (Unified House and Senate)




Note: x's indicate sample means (starting composition)












Note: x's indicate sample means (starting composition)

Non-Unified







Unified Legislature to Non-Unified

Note: x's indicate sample means (starting composition)



Non-Unified to Unified Legislature

Predicted Proportion
Note: x's indicate sample means (starting composition)

.3

.4

.2

Long-Run Short-Run

Long-Run Short-Run

.5

Figure 15: Switching Control (Unified House and Senate)


.1

Higher Education

Elementary Education


4 Operationalizing Partisanship: Unified Legislature (Democratic)

In this section we operationalize partisan control as a dichotomous variable equal to one if the Democratic party controls both the House and Senate.





Note: x's indicate sample means (starting composition)






Note: x's indicate sample means (starting composition)







Unified Legislature (Dem)






Note: x's indicate sample means (starting composition)







Note: x's indicate sample means (starting composition)






Note: x's indicate sample means (starting composition)







Note: x's indicate sample means (starting composition)





Note: x's indicate sample means (starting composition)






Unified Legislature (Dem) to Non-Unified

Note: x's indicate sample means (starting composition)

Non-Unified to Unified Legislature (Dem)



Note: x's indicate sample means (starting composition)




Table of numerical results

	EE SS	HE SS	$\frac{T}{SS}$	PS SS	NR&S SS	$\frac{H}{SS}$	LMP SS	IOD SS	Other SS
Lagged DV	-0.257***	-0.050***	-0.093***	-0.088***	-0.066***	-0.134***	-0.085***	-0.048***	-0.112***
	(0.020)	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.013)
Lagged DV × Democratic Gov.	0.040	-0.005 (0.012)	0.009	0.019	0.018 (0.016)	0.042** (0.021)	-0.003 (0.016)	-0.021* (0.013)	0.025 (0.018)
ΔInflation _t	-0.112*** (0.018)	-0.006* (0.004)	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.008* (0.004)	-0.001 (0.006)	0.031* (0.018)	0.002	-0.008 (0.007)	0.027***
inflation _{t-1}	-0.028* (0.015)	0.003 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.004)	0.003	0.001 (0.004)	0.012 (0.014)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.011** (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)
$\Delta(\text{Inflation}_t \times \text{Democratic Gov}_t)$	-0.015 (0.019)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.006)	0.002	0.003	-0.026 (0.020)	-0.008 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.009
Inflation _{t-1} × Democratic Gov. _{t-1}	-0.049** (0.020)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.005	0.003	0.003	0.002 (0.017)	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.008 (0.006)	0.007
$\Delta Tot. Exp.t$	-0.000	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000**** (0.000)	-0.000**** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000	-0.000**** (0.000)	0.000***
Fot. Exp_{t-1}	0.000 (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
$\Delta(\text{Tot. Exp.}_t \times \text{Democratic Gov.}_t)$	-0.000	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Inflation _{t-1} × Democratic Gov. _{t-1}	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000
ΔUnemployment _t	0.034 (0.023)	0.001 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.007)	-0.000 (0.006)	-0.005 (0.008)	0.031 (0.023)	0.021**** (0.007)	0.017* (0.009)	-0.022** (0.009)
Unemployment _{t-1}	0.003 (0.013)	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.009** (0.004)	-0.008*** (0.003)	-0.012*** (0.004)	-0.004 (0.013)	0.006 (0.004)	0.005	-0.012** (0.005)
Δ (Unemployment _t × Democratic Gov. _t)	-0.014 (0.023)	0.000 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.005)	0.004 (0.008)	-0.048** (0.023)	0.007	-0.006 (0.008)	0.002
Unemployment _{t-1} × Democratic Gov _{t-1}	0.013 (0.018)	0.003 (0.004)	0.000 (0.006)	0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.006)	-0.013 (0.018)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.007)	0.005
ΔW Unemployment _t	0.037***	-0.003	-0.003	-0.007***	0.001	-0.010	0.012***	0.000	-0.016**
	(0.009)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
WUnemployment _{t-1}	0.003	-0.001	0.000	-0.001	-0.000	0.009**	-0.001	0.004***	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Δ (WUnemployment _t × Democratic Gov. _t)	0.009	0.001	-0.001	0.002	-0.003	0.013*	0.003	0.001	0.000
	(0.007)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
(WUnemployment _{t-1} × Democratic Gov _{-t-1}	0.005	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000	0.000	-0.001	0.003**	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
∆Own Source Rev _t	0.037***	0.005***	0.000	0.003**	0.003	-0.004	0.009***	0.005**	-0.003
	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Own Source Rev_{t-1}	0.008**	0.001	0.000	0.003***	0.001	-0.004	0.002**	0.002	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Δ (Own Source Rev _t ×	-0.003	0.000	0.000	-0.001	-0.001	0.001	-0.002**	0.002	0.000
Democratic Gov. _t)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Own Source $\operatorname{Rev}_{t-1} \times$	-0.001	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.004	0.000	0.002	0.000
Democratic Gov_t)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
WPersonal Income _t	0.030***	0.004*	0.005*	0.004*	0.003	0.002	-0.002	0.014***	-0.002
	(0.009)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
WPersonal Income _{t-1}	-0.002**	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001	0.000	-0.001**	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Δ (WPersonal Income _t × Democratic Gov. _t)	-0.001	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.001	-0.004**	-0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
WPersonal Income _{t-1} × Democratic Gov. _{t-1}	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.001***	0.000	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
APersonal Income _t	0.020	0.001	0.003	-0.006	0.007	0.008	-0.020***	-0.002	-0.004
	(0.025)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.026)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Personal Income _{t-1}	-0.007	-0.002	-0.002	0.000	-0.001	-0.000	0.001	0.002	-0.000
	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Δ (Personal Income _t × Democratic Gov. _t)	0.009	0.001	-0.000	0.001	0.002	0.012	0.005	-0.006	0.001
	(0.010)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Personal Income _{t-1} × Democratic Gov. _{t-1}	0.003	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	0.002	0.002	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Constant	-0.414*	-0.047	0.005	-0.290***	-0.075	-0.476**	-0.307***	-0.443***	-0.205**
	(0.227)	(0.046)	(0.072)	(0.060)	(0.075)	(0.240)	(0.076)	(0.089)	(0.088)
N	1236	1236	1236	1236	1236	1236	1236	1236	1236
	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50

Table 1: Estimated short-run and long-run effects on State Budget Spending

States5050505050Standard errors in parenthesesRegression with standard errors in parentheses?* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

References

Klarner, Carl. 2013. "State Partisan Balance Data, 1937-2011." http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/20403 IQSS Dataverse Network.